E-Notes

Is America’s Afghan War in Trouble?

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

November 2, 2001

Alvin Z. Rubinstein is a Senior Fellow at FPRI. His previous E-Notes include America’s War Against Terrorism and and Afghanistan After the Taliban

The U.S. war in Afghanistan seems to be losing momentum and focus. The Generals talk of running out of targets, but insist that they are proceeding according to a game plan, and that major victories will eventually materialize; the diplomats rush from one capital of a supposed partner in the international coalition against terrorism to another, exhorting determination and cooperation, but for the most part leaving only with earnest dissimulations and guarded declarations of support, and President George Bush’s inner circle— a cohort from his father’s administration and the Cold War era— reacts in ways that suggest it is still wedded to the misjudgments made then about the exercise of power in the management of the Middle East. And all this comes at a time when “soft” members of the coalition are leaking criticisms and doubts regarding America’s course.

Uneasiness over the handling of the war is growing. It stems from the disconnectedness between the approaches of the political and military leaderships. In a sense, at the heart of the matter is the question, “What is victory?” Carried away by rhetoric, President Bush made unfortunate calls for a “crusade” (a term that in the Middle East conveys aggression by Christian infidels against Islam) against “global terrorism” (as all-encompassing as it is vague). However, in reality, the administration is wisely concentrating on hunting down Osama bin Laden, destroying his network, and toppling the virulently anti-American, anti-Western Taliban regime of Mullah Mohammed Omar, which harbors the terrorists. The enemy is clear, so must be the outcome.

Victory means something very different to the enemy. To them and their apocalyptically-driven followers, victory is surviving long enough to expose the hollowness of U.S. military power, showing that much weaker countries can frustrate and humble the global hegemon, and letting the hard blows inflicted on the United States sink in and motivate others who wish to do it ill.

President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and others talk of a long campaign and staying the course, but they are not acting as if they are in what may well be the most dangerous war the United States has ever fought. Coming in the wake of September 11, the anthrax attacks are harbingers of threats ahead. In a region where power is universally respected, the Taliban and al-Qaeda must not be permitted to emerge with enhanced prestige and new adherents. The United States must bring to bear, now, all the power it possesses to make others see the folly of following the lead of bin Laden and the Taliban.

I suggest that three urgent issues must be settled and explained fully to the citizens of this country, and to countries abroad: first, the U.S. position on the continuation of war during the Muslims’ holy month of Ramadan, which begins on November 16; second, the advantages of continuing and intensifying the bombing campaign; and third, developments to date in progress toward establishing a stable, decentralized system of governance and power-sharing among the different ethnic communities in Afghanistan. In the process, it might help to thank those governments who are working closely with us.

Ramadan has special religious significance for Muslims. Political, religious, and cultural groups are already pressuring for a halt to the bombing campaign, out of deference to Muslims and as a sign of respect for Islam. They contend that a bombing halt would convince Muslims that the United States is not an enemy of Islam, would give the Taliban an opportunity to reconsider its initial rejection of U.S. conditions, and would encourage Muslim religious leaders to intercede for a non-military solution.

These are reasons, but not good ones. Given the horror of their deeds, neither Osama bin Laden nor Mullah Mohammed Omar can be viewed as Muslims any more than Hitler or Himmler could be considered Christians. They are beyond the pale of any religious community, as President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan recognized in courageously supporting the United States against the Taliban, which his country created in the first place. The notion of a halt in the war against the Taliban would be foolhardy and shameful catering to political correctness and politicking for votes. There is no prohibition in Islam against conducting military operations during Ramadan, witness the strategic deception by Egypt and Syria when they launched their attack on Israel in October 1973, in the first week of Ramadan: their aims were tactical surprise and the advantages afforded by favorable atmospheric conditions.

The United States has until the end of November to use its overwhelming air power to achieve some crucial military and political advantages. After that, snow will block the passes and roads, and the weather will severely restrict air operations until April. Make no mistake: if the Taliban is still in power, as seems very likely, it will have won an enormous victory—-no matter the eventual outcome.

But there is still time to weaken the Taliban’s position and greatly improve the prospects of the Northern Alliance, the opposition movement of primarily Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara tribes and clans located in the northeastern part of the country. The key to the north is possession of Mazar-I-Sharif, the road to Uzbekistan and a source of steady supplies, as well as the crucial road to the west. Here, the Taliban and the “Afghan Arabs,” if ousted from the Uzbek area, can be attacked throughout the winter and decoupled from their line of supply. In the next month, the approximately 1,000 sorties that the USAF has flown during three weeks in October should be doubled, at a minimum, with round-the-clock strikes directed at Taliban defenses in the Mazar-I-Sharif area. Wherever possible, they should be coordinated with ground attacks mounted by the Northern Alliance. There will be time enough later on to deplore the errant bombs and civilian casualties. Of course, there is the danger of an intensive bombing campaign in Ramadan conferring on its recipients the mantle of “shahadat,” or martyrdom, which could endanger the very regimes in the Muslim world whose support is essential to us. But the stakes are enormous, and risks should be taken.

Expelling Taliban forces from some of the territory they control should be top priority. As the capture and execution of the Abdul Haq, a former mujahidin and Pushtun hero, has shown, the Taliban is holding its adherents in the Pushtun heartland in the south, along the Kandahar, Kabul, Jalalabad axis. Bombing Taliban positions just north of Kabul is unlikely to open the road to the capital before the end of November. But Mazar-I-Sharif is ripe for retaking. It requires only a reordering of current Air Force target priorities and a political decision to strengthen the Northern Alliance significantly. The United States will have to reassure Pakistan that it will not support any offensive by the Northern Alliance to recapture Kabul on its own. Moreover, the U.S. should make unmistakably clear to the Northern Alliance that it will receive our full support, military and economic, for the strengthening of their position in the north, in areas that are primarily Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara in character. Kabul will have to wait for more propitious political circumstances.

Such a coherent, interrelated push from Washington would bring two significant advantages. With the north in control of the Northern Alliance, the United States would immediately have secure bases in friendly areas of Afghanistan, from which to strike at the Taliban during the winter months; and it would have stable supply lines from bases in nearby Uzbekistan. Politically, it would provide the United States with a golden opportunity to help the Northern alliance build up its part of the country, economically and administratively, in ways that it never did before. The ethnic and tribal areas under its control would be fed, clothed ,and assisted in returning the local economy back to a semblance of normalcy. In this way, the U.S. can help develop the outlines of a model of autonomy and self-government which might attract tribal and clan leaders in Pushtun areas who might consider defecting. If Afghanistan is to be helped to recover, the task must be done province-by-province. In this process, the U.S. can help.

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